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Abstract
In wireless data networks, communication is particularly susceptible to eavesdropping due to its broadcast
nature. Security and privacy systems have become critical for wireless providers and enterprise networks. This
paper considers the problem of secret communication over the Gaussian broadcast channel, where a multi-antenna
transmitter sends independent confidential messages to two users with information-theoretic secrecy. That is, each
user would like to obtain its own confidential message in a reliable and safe manner. This communication model
is referred to as the multi-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages (MGBC-CM). Under
this communication scenario, a secret dirty-paper coding scheme and the corresponding achievable secrecy rate
region are first developed based on Gaussian codebooks. Next, a computable Sato-type outer bound on the secrecy
capacity region is provided for the MGBC-CM. Furthermore, the Sato-type outer bound prove to be consistent with
the boundary of the secret dirty-paper coding achievable rate region, and hence, the secrecy capacity region of the
MGBC-CM is established. Finally, two numerical examples demonstrate that both users can achieve positive rates
simultaneously under the information-theoretic secrecy requirement.
Index Terms
secret communication, broadcast channels, multiple antennas, information-theoretic secrecy
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for efficient, reliable, and secret data communication over wireless networks has been rising
rapidly for decades. Due to its broadcast nature, wireless communication is particularly susceptible to
eavesdropping. The inherent problematic nature of wireless networks exposes not only the risks and
vulnerabilities that a malicious user can exploit and severely compromise the network, but also multiplies
information confidentiality concerns with respect to in-network terminals. Hence, security and privacy
systems have become critical for wireless providers and enterprise networks.
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Fig. 1. Multiple-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential message
In this work, we consider multiple antenna secret broadcast in wireless networks. This research is
inspired by the seminal paper [1], in which Wyner introduced the so-called wiretap channel and proposed
an information theoretic approach to secret communication schemes. Under the assumption that the channel
to the eavesdropper is a degraded version of that to the desired receiver, Wyner characterized the capacity-
secrecy tradeoff for the discrete memoryless wiretap channel and showed that secret communication is
possible without sharing a secret key. Later, the result was extended by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner who determined
the secrecy capacity for the non-degraded broadcast channel (BC) with a single confidential message
intended for one of the users [2].
In more general wireless network scenarios, secret communication may involve multiple users and
multiple antennas. Motivated by wireless communication, where transmitted signals are broadcast and can
be received by all users within the communication range, a significant research effort has been invested
in the study of the information-theoretic limits of secret communication in different wireless network
environments including multi-user communication with confidential messages [3]–[11], secret wireless
communication on fading channels [12]–[15], and the Gaussian multiple-input single-output (MISO) and
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels [16]–[21].
These issues motivate us to study the multi-antenna Gaussian BC with confidential messages (MGBC-
CM), in which independent confidential messages from a multi-antenna transmitter are to be communicated
to two users. The corresponding broadcast communication model is shown in Fig. 1. Each user would
like to obtain its own message reliably and confidentially.
To give insight into this problem, we first consider a single-antenna Gaussian BC. Note that this channel
is degraded [22], which means that if a message can be successfully decoded by the inferior user, then the
3superior user is also ensured of decoding it. Hence, the secrecy rate of the inferior user is zero and this
problem is reduced to the scalar Gaussian wiretap channel problem [23] whose secrecy capacity is now the
maximum rate achievable by the superior user. This analysis gives rise to the question: can the transmitter,
in fact, communicate with both users confidentially at nonzero rate under some other conditions? Roughly
speaking, the answer is in the affirmative. In particular, the transmitter can communicate when equipped
with sufficiently separated multiple antennas.
We here have two goals motivated directly by questions arising in practice. The first is to determine the
condition under which both users can obtain their own confidential messages in a reliable and safe manner.
This is equivalent to evaluating the secrecy capacity region for the MGBC-CM. The second is to show
how the transmitter should broadcast confidentially, which is equivalent to designing an achievable secret
coding scheme. To this end, we first describe a secret dirty-paper coding (DPC) scheme and derive the
corresponding achievable secrecy rate region based on Gaussian codebooks. The secret DPC is based on
double-binning [24] which enables both joint encoding and preserving confidentiality. Next, a computable
Sato-type outer bound on the secrecy capacity region is developed for the MGBC-CM. Furthermore,
the Sato-type outer bound prove to be consistent with the boundary of the secret dirty-paper coding
achievable rate region, and hence, the secrecy capacity region of the MGBC-CM is established. Finally,
two numerical examples demonstrate that both users can achieve positive rates simultaneously under the
information-theoretic secrecy requirement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The system model and definitions are introduced
in Section II. The main results on the secrecy capacity region of the MGBC-CM is state in Section III.
The achievability proof associated with the secret DPC scheme is established in Section IV. The converse
proof is derived in Section V based on the Sato-type outer bound. Finally, Section VI shows numerical
examples and Section VII points our our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
A. Channel Model
We consider the communication of confidential messages to two users over a Gaussian BC via t ≥ 2
transmit-antennas. Each user is equipped with a single receive-antenna. As shown in Fig. 1, the transmitter
sends independent confidential messages W1 and W2 in n channel uses with nR1 and nR2 bits, respectively.
The message W1 is destined for user 1 and eavesdropped by user 2, whereas the message W2 is destined
4for user 2 and eavesdropped by user 1. This communication scenario is referred to as the multi-antenna
Gaussian BC with confidential messages. The Gaussian BC is an additive noise channel and the received
symbols at user 1 and user 2 are represented using the following expression:
y1,i = h
Hxi + z1,i
y2,i = g
Hxi + z2,i, i = 1, . . . , n (1)
where xi ∈ Ct is a complex input vector at time i, {z1,i} and {z2,i} correspond to two independent,
zero-mean, unit-variance, complex Gaussian noise sequences, and h, g ∈ Ct are fixed, complex channel
attenuation vectors imposed on user 1 and user 2, respectively. The channel input is constrained by
tr(KX) ≤ P , where P is the average total power limitation at the transmitter. We also assume that both
the transmitter and users are aware of the attenuation vectors.
B. Important Channel Parameters for the MGBC-CM
For the MGBC-CM, we are interested in the following important parameters, which are related to the
generalized eigenvalue problem (see Appendix I for the details).
Let λ1 and e1 denote the largest generalized eigenvalue and the corresponding normalized eigenvector
of the pencil (I + PhhH , I + PggH) so that eH1 e1 = 1 and
(I + PhhH)e1 = λ1(I + Pgg
H)e1. (2)
Similarly, we define λ2 and e2 as the largest generalized eigenvalue and the corresponding normalized
eigenvector of the pencil (I + PggH, I + PhhH) so that eH2 e2 = 1 and
(I + PggH)e2 = λ2(I + Phh
H)e2. (3)
An useful property of λ1 and λ2 is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For any channel attenuation vector pair h and g, the largest generalized eigenvalues of the
pencil (I + PhhH , I + PggH) and the pencil (I + PggH, I + PhhH) satisfy
λ1 ≥ 1 and λ2 ≥ 1. (4)
Moreover, if h and g are linearly independent, then both λ1 and λ2 are strictly greater than 1.
Proof: We provide the proof in Appendix I.
5C. Definitions
We now define the secret codebook, the probability of error, the secrecy level, and the secrecy capacity
region for the MGBC-CM as follows.
An (2nR1 , 2nR2, n) secret codebook for the MGBC-CM consists of the following:
1) Two message sets W1 = {1, . . . , 2nR1} and W2 = {1, . . . , 2nR2}.
2) An stochastic encoding function is specified by a matrix of conditional probability density p(xn|w1, w2),
where xn = [x1, . . . ,xn] ∈ Ct×n, wk ∈ Wk, and
∫
xn
p(xn|w1, w2) = 1.
3) Decoding functions φ1 and φ2. The decoding function at user k is a deterministic mapping
φk : Y
n
k →Wk.
Remark 1: To increase the randomness of transmitted messages, we consider a stochastic encoder at the
transmitter. In other words, p(xn|w1, w2) is the conditional probability density that the messages (w1, w2)
are jointly encoded as the channel input sequence xn.
At the receiver ends, the error performance and the secrecy level are evaluated by the following
performance measures.
1) The reliability is measured by the maximum error probability
P (n)e , max
{
P
(n)
e,1 , P
(n)
e,2
}
where P (n)e,k is the error probability for user k given by
P
(n)
e,k = 2
−n(R1+R2)
∑
w1∈W1
∑
w2∈W2
Pr
[
φk(Y
n
k ) 6= wk
∣∣(w1, w2) sent]. (5)
2) The secrecy levels with respect to confidential messages W1 and W2 are measured, respectively, at
user 2 and user 1 with respect to the equivocation rates
1
n
H(W2|Y
n
1 ) and
1
n
H(W1|Y
n
2 ). (6)
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for the MGBC-CM if, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an
6(2nR1, 2nR2 , n) code that satisfies P (n)e ≤ ǫ, and the information-theoretic secrecy requirement1
nR1 −H(W1|Y
n
2 ) ≤ nǫ
and nR2 −H(W2|Y n1 ) ≤ nǫ. (7)
The secrecy capacity region CMGs of the MGBC-CM is the closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs
(R1, R2).
III. MAIN RESULT: SECRECY CAPACITY REGION FOR THE MGBC-CM
The two-user Gaussian BC with multiple transmit-antennas is non-degraded. For this channel, we have
the following closed-from result on the secrecy capacity region under the information-theoretic secrecy
requirement.
Theorem 1: We consider an MGBC-CM modeled in (1). Let
γ1(α) =
1 + αP |hHe1|2
1 + αP |gHe1|2
, (8)
γ2(α) be the largest generalized eigenvalue of the pencil(
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
ggH , I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |hHe1|2
hhH
)
, (9)
and RMG(α) denote the union of all (R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ log2 γ1(α)
and 0 ≤ R2 ≤ log2 γ2(α). (10)
The secrecy capacity region of the MGBC-CM is
CMGs = co
{ ⋃
0≤α≤1
RMG(α)
}
, (11)
where co{S} denotes the convex hull of the set S.
Proof: We provide the achievability proof in Section IV based on a secret dirty paper coding scheme,
and show the converse proof in Section V based on a Sato-type outer bound.
1This definition corresponds to the so-called weak secrecy-key rate [25]. A stronger measurement of the secrecy level has been defined
by Maurer and Wolf in terms of absolute equivocation [25], where the authors have shown that the former definition could replaced by the
latter without any rate penalty in a wiretap channel.
7Based on Theorem 1, we can calculate the boundary of the secrecy capacity region CMGs by choosing
α to trade off the rate R1 for the rate R2. In particular, when α = 1, we obtain
γ1(1) =
eH1 (I + Phh
H)e1
eH1 (I + Pgg
H)e1
= λ1 (12)
and γ2(1) = 1 (13)
where (12) follows from the definitions of λ1 and e1 in (2). Theorem 1 implies that the rate pair (log2 λ1, 0)
is achievable. In fact, this rate pair is the corner point corresponding to the maximum achievable rate of
user 1 in the capacity region CMGs .
Corollary 1: For the MGBC-CM, the maximum secrecy rate of user 1 is given by
R1,max = max
0≤α≤1
log2 γ1(α) = log2 λ1 (14)
where λ1 is the largest generalized eigenvalue of the pencil (I + PhhH , I + PggH).
Proof: See Appendix II.
Example 1: (MISO Wiretap Channels) A special case of the MGBC-CM model is the Gaussian MISO
wiretap channel studied in [16], [18], [20], where the transmitter sends confidential information to only
one user and treats another user as an eavesdropper. Let us consider a Gaussian MISO wiretap channel
modeled in (1), where user 1 is the legitimate receiver and user 2 is the eavesdropper. Corollary 1 implies
that the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MISO wiretap channel corresponds to the corner point of CMGs .
Hence, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MISO wiretap channel is given by
CMISOs = log2 λ1, (15)
which coincides with the result of [18].
For the MGBC-CM, the actions of user 1 and user 2 are symmetric to each other, i.e., each user
decodes its own message and eavesdrops the confidential information belonging to another user. Based on
symmetry of this two-user BC model, we can express the secrecy capacity region CMGs in an alternative
way.
Corollary 2: For an MGBC-CM modeled in (1), the secrecy capacity region can be written as
CMGs = co
{ ⋃
0≤β≤1
RMG−2(β)
}
(16)
8where RMG−2(β) denotes the union of all (R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ log2 ξ1(β)
and 0 ≤ R2 ≤ log2 ξ2(β), (17)
ξ1(β) is the largest generalized eigenvalue of the pencil(
I +
(1− β)P
1 + βP |hHe2|2
hhH , I +
(1− β)P
1 + βP |gHe2|2
ggH
)
(18)
and
ξ2(β) =
1 + βP |gHe2|2
1 + βP |hHe2|2
. (19)
Proof: The derivation follows from the same approach of the proof for Theorem 1 by reversing the
roles of user 1 and user 2.
Remark 2: Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 imply that if α and β satisfy the implicit function γ1(α) = ξ1(β),
then
RMG(α) = RMG−2(β).
For example, it is easy to check RMG(1) = RMG−2(0).
Now, by applying Corollary 2 and setting β = 1, we can show that the rate pair (0, log2 λ2) is the
corner point corresponding to the maximum achievable rate of user 2 in the capacity region CMGs .
Corollary 3: For the MGBC-CM, the maximum secrecy rate of user 2 is given by
R2,max = log2 λ2 (20)
where λ2 is the largest generalized eigenvalue of the pencil (I + PggH, I + PhhH).
Proof: The derivation follows from the same approach of the proof for Corollary 1.
Corollaries 1 and 3 imply that for the MGBC-CM, both users can achieve positive rates with information-
theoretic secrecy if and only if λ1 > 1 and λ2 > 1. Lemma 1 illusrtates that this condition can be ensured
when the attenuation vectors h and g are linear independent.
IV. SECRET DPC CODING SCHEME AND ACHIEVABILITY PROOF
We first briefly review the prior information-theoretic result on the achievable rate region for the BC
with confidential messages (BC-CM) of [24]. Based on this result, we develop the achievable secret coding
9scheme for the MGBC-CM and find the capacity achieving input covariance matrix.
A. Double-Binning Inner bound for the BC-CM
An achievable rate region for the BC-CM has been established in [24] based on a double-binning
scheme that enables both joint encoding at the transmitter by using Slepian-Wolf binning [26] and
preserving confidentiality by using random binning. We summarize the double-binning codebook and
encoding strategy in Appendix III for completeness.
Lemma 2: ( [24, Theorem 3]) Let V1 and V2 be auxiliary random variables, Ω denote the class of
joint probability densities p(v1,v2,x, y1, y2) that factor as
p(v1,v2)p(x|v1,v2)p(y1, y2|x), (21)
and RI(π) denote the union of all (R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1)− I(V1; Y2|V2)− I(V1;V2) (22)
and 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2)− I(V2; Y1|V1)− I(V1;V2) (23)
for a given joint probability density π ∈ Ω. For the BC-CM, any rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ co
{⋃
π∈Ω
RI(π)
}
(24)
is achievable.
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in [24]. Here, we provide an alternative view on this result. Since
randomization can increase secrecy, we employ stochastic encoding at the transmitter so that the size of
the secret codebook is larger than the size of message set. Let R′ denote the redundant rate used to prevent
the confidentiality. The best known achievable region for a general BC was found by Marton of [27].
Now, for a given joint density p(v1,v2,x), a special case of the Marton sum rate (without a common
rate) is given by
R1 +R2 +R
′ ≤ I(V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2)− I(V1;V2). (25)
On the other hand, the total (both the intended and the eavesdropped) information rate obtained by user 2
is limited by I(V1,V2; Y2). Intuitively, to keep the message W1 secret from user 2, the redundant rate R′
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should satisfy that
R2 +R
′ ≥ I(V1,V2; Y2). (26)
This implies that to satisfy the information-theoretic secrecy requirement, the achievable secrecy rate of
user 1 can be written as
R1 ≤ [I(V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2)− I(V1;V2)]− I(V1,V2; Y2). (27)
Similarly, the achievable secrecy rate of user 2 can be written as
R2 ≤ [I(V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2)− I(V1;V2)]− I(V1,V2; Y1). (28)
Bounds (27) and (28) lead to the achievable secrecy rate region in Lemma 2.
Remark 3: For the BC with confidential messages, one can employ joint encoding at the transmitter.
However, to preserve confidentiality, both achievable rate expressions in (22) and (23) include a penalty
term I(V1;V2). Hence, compared with Marton’s achievable region [27] for a general BC, here, one need
to pay “double” for jointly encoding at the transmitter.
B. Secret DPC Scheme for the MGBC-CM
The achievable strategy in Lemma 2 introduces a double-binning coding scheme. However, when the
rate region (24) is used as a constructive technique, it not clear how to choose the auxiliary random
variables V1 and V2 to implement the double-binning codebook, and hence, one has to “guess” the
density of p(v1,v2,x). Here, we employ the DPC technique with the double-binning code structure to
develop the secret DPC (S-DPC) achievable rate region for the MGBC-CM.
For the MGBC-CM, we consider a secret dirty-paper encoder with Gaussian codebooks as follows.
First, we sperate the channel input X into two random vectors U1 and U2 so that
U1 +U2 = X. (29)
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We choose U1 and U2 as well as auxiliary random variables V1 and V2 as follows:
U1 ∼ CN (0, KU1),
U2 ∼ CN (0, KU2), independent of U1
V1 = U1 + bh
HU2 and V2 = U2 (30)
where KU1 and KU2 are covariance matrices of U1 and U2, respectively, and
b =
KU1h
1 + hHKU1h
. (31)
Based on the conditions (30) and Lemma 2, we obtain a S-DPC rate region for the MGBC-CM as follows.
Lemma 3: [S-DPC region] Let RS−DPCI (KU1 , KU2) denote the union of all (R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ log2
1 + hHKU1h
1 + gHKU1g
(32)
and 0 ≤ R2 ≤ log2
1 + gH(KU1 +KU2)g
1 + hH(KU1 +KU2)h
+ log2
1 + hHKU1h
1 + gHKU1g
. (33)
Then, any rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ co


⋃
tr(KU1+KU2)≤P
RS−DPCI (KU1 , KU2)

 (34)
is achievable for the MGBC-CM.
Proof: See the Appendix III.
Remark 4: We choose the random variables U1, U2, V1, V2 and X as the same as the classical DPC
strategy (e.g., see [28], [29]). However, the S-DPC scheme is different from the classical one. The codebook
and the coding structure of the S-DPC scheme is based on the double-binning (see Appendix III).
C. Achievability Proof of Theorem 1
The S-DPC achievable rate region (34) requires optimization of the covariance matrices KU1 and KU2 .
In order to achievable the boundary of CMGs , we choose KU1 and KU2 as follows:
KU1 = αPe1e
H
1
and KU2 = (1− α)Pc2(α)cH2 (α), for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (35)
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where e1 is defined in (2) and c2(α) is a normalized eigenvector of the pencil (9) corresponding to γ2(α)
so that cH2 (α)c2(α) = 1 and(
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
ggH
)
c2(α) = γ2(α)
(
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |hHe1|2
hhH
)
c2(α). (36)
Since U1 and U2 are independent, (29) implies that the input covariance matrix can be written as follows:
KX = KU1 +KU2
= αPe1e
H
1 + (1− α)Pc2(α)c
H
2 (α), for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. (37)
Hence, we have
tr(KX) = tr(KU1 +KU2) = P, (38)
i.e., the channel input power constraint is satisfied.
Next, inserting (35) into (32) and (33), we obtain
1 + hHKU1h
1 + gHKU1g
= γ1(α) (39)
and
[1 + gH(KU1 +KU2)g][1 + h
HKU1h]
[1 + hH(KU1 +KU2)h][1 + g
HKU1g]
= γ2(α). (40)
where the intermediate steps for deriving (40) are given in Appendix III. Now, by substituting (39) and
(40) into Lemma 3, we obtain the desired achievable result.
Remark 5: The secrecy capacity region CMGs can be achieved by using the S-DPC scheme, in which
the capacity achieving input covariance matrix is with rank 2. Furthermore, by reversing the roles of user
1 and user 2, we have the achievability proof for Corollary 2.
V. SATO-TYPE OUTER BOUND AND CONVERSE PROOF
In this section, we first describe a new Sato-type outer bound that can be applied to both discrete
memoryless and Gaussian broadcast channels with confidential messages. Next, a computable Gaussian
version of this bound is derived for the MGBC-CM. Finally, we prove that the Sato-type outer bound
coincides with the secrecy capacity region CMGs .
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A. Sato-Type Outer Bound
We consider an important property for the BC-CM in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Let P denote the set of channels pY˜1,Y˜2|X whose marginal distributions satisfy
pY˜1|X(y1|x) = pY1|X(y1|x)
and pY˜2|X(y2|x) = pY1|X(y2|x) (41)
for all y1, y2 and x. The secrecy capacity region CMGs is the same for the channels pY˜1,Y˜2|X ∈ P .
Proof: We provide the proof in Appendix III.
We note that P is the set of channels pY˜1,Y˜2|X that have the same marginal distributions as the original
channel transition density pY1,Y2|X. Lemma 4 implies that the secrecy capacity region CMGs depends only
on marginal distributions.
Theorem 2: Let RO
(
PY˜1,Y˜2|X, PX
)
denote the union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(X; Y˜1, Y˜2)− I(X; Y˜2) (42)
and R2 ≤ I(X; Y˜1, Y˜2)− I(X; Y˜1) (43)
for given distributions PX and PY˜1,Y˜2|X. The secrecy capacity region C
MG
s of the BC-CM satisfies
CMGs ⊆
⋂
P
Y˜1,Y˜2|X
∈P
{⋃
PX
RO
(
PY˜1,Y˜2|X, PX
)}
. (44)
Proof: See the Appendix III.
Remark 6: The outer bound (44) follows by evaluating the secrecy level at each user end in an individual
manner, while by letting the users decode their messages in a cooperative manner. In this sense, we refer
to this bound as “Sato-type” outer bound.
For example, we consider the confidential message W1 that is destined for user 1 (corresponding to
Y˜1) and eavesdropped by user 2 (corresponding to Y˜2). We assume that a genie gives user 1 the signal
Y˜2 as the side information for decoding W1. Note that the eavesdropped signal Y˜2 at user 2 is always a
degraded version of the entire received signal (Y˜1, Y˜2). This permits the use of the wiretap channel result
of [1].
Remark 7: Although Theorem 2 is based on a degraded argument, the outer bound (44) can be applied
to general broadcast channels with confidential messages.
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B. Sato-Type Outer Bound for the MGBC-CM
For the Gaussian BC, the family P is the set of channels
y˜1 = h
Hx+ z˜1
y˜2 = g
Hx+ z˜2 (45)
where z˜1 and z˜2 correspond to arbitrarily correlated, zero-mean, unit-variance, complex Gaussian random
variables. Let ρ denote the covariance between Z˜1 and Z˜2, i.e,
Cov
(
Z˜1, Z˜2
)
= ρ and |ρ|2 ≤ 1.
Now, the rate region RO
(
PY˜1,Y˜2|X, PX
)
is a function of the noise covariance ρ and the input covariance
matrix KX. We consider a computable Sato-type outer bound for the MGBC-CM in the following lemma.
Lemma 5: Let RMGO (ρ,KX) denote the union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ f1(ρ,KX) (46)
and 0 ≤ R2 ≤ f2(ρ,KX) (47)
where
f1(ρ,KX) = min
ν∈C
log2
(h− νg)HKX(h− νg) + 1 + |ν|2 − ν∗ρ− ρ∗ν
(1− |ρ|2)
(48)
and f2(ρ,KX) = min
µ∈C
log2
(g − µh)HKX(g− µh) + 1 + |µ|2 − µ∗ρ− ρ∗µ
(1− |ρ|2)
. (49)
For the MGBC-CM, the secrecy capacity region CMGs satisfies
CMGs ⊆
⋃
tr(KX)≤P
RO(ρ,KX) (50)
for any 0 ≤ |ρ| ≤ 1.
Proof: We provide the proof in Appendix III.
C. Converse Proof of Theorem 1
In this subsection, we prove that the Sato-type outer bound of Lemma 5 coincides with the secrecy
capacity region CMGs by properly choosing the parameter ρ.
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1) Choosing the parameter ρ: Note that Lemma 5 is true for any ρ such that 0 ≤ |ρ| ≤ 1. In particular,
we consider
ρo ,
gHe1
hHe1
. (51)
The definitions of λ1 and e1 in (2) imply that
|hHe1|
2 − λ1|g
He1|
2 =
λ1 − 1
P
. (52)
Since λ1 ≥ 1 (see Lemma 1), we obtain ∣∣∣∣gHe1hHe1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1. (53)
Hence, we can choose ρ = ρo in Lemma 5.
2) Determining the relationship between KX and α: We observe that the rate region RMGO (ρo, KX)
defined in Lemma 5 is a function of the input covariance matrix KX, while the rate region RMG(α)
defined in Theorem 1 is a function of α. In order to prove the main result, we build the relationship
between KX and α in the following lemma.
Lemma 6: For any input covariance matrix KX with tr(KX) ≤ P , there exists a α ∈ [0, 1] such that
L(KX, α) = 0, where
L(KX, α) = [h− ρoγ1(α)g]
H(KX − αPe1e
H
1 )[h− ρoγ1(α)g]. (54)
Proof: We provide the proof in Appendix IV.
Based on the function L(·), we define the subset of input covariance matrices in terms of α as follows:
L(α) = {KX : L(KX, α) = 0}. (55)
Moreover, Lemma 6 implies that
⋃
0≤α≤1
L(α) = {KX : tr(KX) ≤ P}. (56)
3) Bound on f1(ρo, KX): Now, we prove that if KX ∈ L(α), then
f1(ρo, KX) ≤ log2 γ1(α). (57)
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Let ν(α) = ρoγ1(α). For a given KX ∈ L(α), the definition (48) implies that
f1(ρo, KX) ≤ log2
[h− ν(α)g]HKX[h− ν(α)g] + 1 + |ν(α)|
2 − ν∗(α)ρo − ρ
∗
oν(α)
1− |ρo|2
= log2
αP
∣∣[h− ρoγ1(α)g]He1∣∣2 + 1 + |ρo|2γ21(α)− 2|ρo|2γ1(α)
1− |ρo|2
. (58)
Based on the definition of ρo in (51), we have
h− ρoγ1(α)g = h− γ1(α)
ggHe1
hHe1
=
[
hhH − γ1(α)ggH
hHe1
]
e1. (59)
Hence,
∣∣[h− ρoγ1(α)g]He1∣∣2 =
[
|hHe1|
2 − γ1(α)|g
He1|
2
]2
|hHe1|2
=
[
|hHe1|
2 − γ1(α)|g
He1|
2
]
[1− γ1(α)|ρo|
2]
=
[
γ1(α)− 1
αP
]
[1− γ1(α)|ρo|
2] (60)
where the last step of (60) follows from the definition of γ1(α) in (8). Substituting (60) into (58), we
obtain
f1(ρo, KX) ≤ log2
[γ1(α)− 1][1− γ1(α)|ρo|2] + 1 + |ρo|2γ21(α)− 2|ρo|
2γ1(α)
1− |ρo|2
= log2
γ1(α)− |ρo|
2γ1(α)
1− |ρo|2
= log2 γ1(α). (61)
4) Bound on f2(ρo, KX): Here, we prove that if KX ∈ L(α), then
f1(ρo, KX) ≤ log2 γ2(α) (62)
where γ2(α) is the largest generalized eigenvalue of the pencil (9). In fact, the smallest generalized
eigenvalue of the pencil (9) is γ1(α)/λ1. This result is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 7: γ1(α)/λ1 and e1(α) are the smallest generalized eigenvalue and the corresponding normal-
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ized eigenvector of the pencil
(
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
ggH, I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |hHe1|2
hhH
)
(63)
where λ1 and e1(α) are defined in (2), and γ1(α) is defined in (8).
Proof: We provide the proof in Appendix IV.
Based on the property of generalized eigenvalues (see Appendix I), Lemma 7 implies that
eH1
[
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
ggH
]
c2(α) = 0 (64)
and eH1
[
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |hHe1|2
hhH
]
c2(α) = 0 (65)
where c2(α) is the normalized eigenvector of the pencil (9) corresponding to γ2(α). Hence,
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
eH1 gg
Hc2(α) = −e
H
1 c2(α) (66)
and (1− α)P
1 + αP |hHe1|2
eH1 hh
Hc2(α) = −e
H
1 c2(α). (67)
By combining the definitions of ρo in (51) and γ1(α) in (8), we obtain
ρo =
gHe1
hHe1
=
1
γ1(α)
[
hHc2(α)
gHc2(α)
]∗
. (68)
We now establish the relationship between γ1(α) and γ2(α) based on (68) in the following lemma.
Lemma 8: For any α ∈ [0, 1],
g − ρ∗oγ2(α)h
|g − ρ∗oγ2(α)h|
2
= c2(α) (69)
and [h− ρoγ1(α)g]H[g − ρ∗oγ2(α)h] = 0 (70)
where γ1(α) is defined in (8), and γ2(α) and c2(α) are the largest generalized eigenvalue and the
corresponding normalized eigenvector of the pencil (9).
Proof: We provide the proof in Appendix IV.
Let c1(α) denote the normalized vector of h− ρoγ1(α)g, i.e.,
c1(α) ,
h− ρoγ1(α)g
|h− ρoγ1(α)g|2
. (71)
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Note that Lemma 8 implies that c1(α) and c2(α) are orthogonal. Moreover, since the input covariance
matrix KX is Hermitian and positive semidefinite, we obtain
cH1 (α)KXc1(α) + c
H
2 (α)KXc2(α) ≤ tr(KX) = P. (72)
Hence, for a given KX ∈ L(α), we have
cH2 (α)KXc2(α) ≤ P − αP |c
H
1 (α)e1|
2
= (1− α)P + αP |cH2 (α)e1|
2. (73)
Inserting (69) into (73), we obtain
[g − ρ∗oγ2(α)h]
HKX[g− ρ
∗
oγ2(α)h] ≤ (1− α)Pζ(α) + αPη(α) (74)
where
ζ(α) , |g− ρ∗oγ2(α)h)|
2 (75)
and η(α) , |g− ρ∗oγ2(α)h|2|eH1 c2(α)|2. (76)
In Appendix IV, we prove the following equality
(1− α)Pζ(α) + αPη(α) = [γ2(α)− 1][1− γ2(α)|ρo|
2]. (77)
Next, we consider the bound on f2(ρo, KX). Let
µ(α) = ρ∗oγ2(α).
For a given KX ∈ L(α), the definition (49) implies that
f2(ρo, KX) ≤ log2
[g − µ(α)h]HKX[g − µ(α)h] + 1 + |µ(α)|2 − µ∗(α)ρo − ρ∗oµ(α)
1− |ρo|2
≤ log2
(1− α)Pζ(α) + αPη(α) + 1 + |ρo|2γ22(α)− 2|ρo|
2γ2(α)
1− |ρo|2
. (78)
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the Sato-type outer bound and secrecy rate regions achieved by time-sharing and simplified DPC schemes for the
example MGBC-CM in (81)
Now, substituting (77) into (78), we obtain
f2(ρo, KX) ≤ log2
[γ2(α)− 1][1− γ2(α)|ρo|2] + 1 + |ρo|2γ22(α)− 2|ρo|
2γ2(α)
1− |ρo|2
= log2 γ2(α). (79)
Finally, Combining (56), (61) and (79), we have the desired result:
⋃
tr(KX)≤P
RO(ρ,KX) ⊆
⋃
0≤α≤1
RMG(α). (80)
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we study two numerical examples to illustrate the secrecy capacity region of the MGBC-
CM. For simplicity, we assume that the Gaussian BC has real input and output alphabets and the channel
attenuation vectors h and g are real too. Under this condition, all calculated rate values are divided by 2.
Example 2: In the first example, we consider the following MGBC-CM
y1
y2

 =

 1.5 0
1.801 0.871



x1
x2

+

z1
z2

 (81)
where h = [1.5, 0]T , g = [1.801, 0.872]T , and the total power constraint is set to P = 10. Fig. 2 illustrates
the secrecy capacity region for the channel (81). We observe that even though each component of the
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the Sato-type outer bound and secrecy rate regions achieved by time-sharing and simplified DPC schemes for the
example MGBC-CM in (82)
attenuation vector h (imposed on user 1) is strictly less than the corresponding component of g (imposed
on user 2), both users can achieve positive rates simultaneously under the information-theoretic secrecy
requirement.
Example 3: In the second example, we consider the MGBC-CM as follows
y1
y2

 =

1.414 1.414
0.4 1.959



x1
x2

+

z1
z2

 (82)
where h = [1.414, 1.414]T , g = [0.4, 1.959]T , and the total power P = 10. The secrecy capacity region
of the channel (82) is calculated and depicted in Fig. 3.
Moreover, we compare the secrecy capacity region with the secrecy rate region achieved by the time-
sharing scheme (indicated by the dash-dot line). The time-sharing refers to the scheme in which the
transmitter sends the confidential message W1 with total power P1 during a fraction τ1 of time, and sends
the confidential message W2 with total power P2 during a fraction τ2 of time, where
τ1 + τ2 = 1 and τ1P1 + τ2P2 = P.
Note that in each time fraction, the MGBC-CM reduces to a Gaussian MISO wiretap channel. Using
such time-sharing, the rate pair
(
τ1
2
log2 λ1(P1),
τ2
2
log2 λ2(P2)
)
is achievable, where λ1(P1) and λ2(P2)
are the largest generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (I + P1hhH , I + P1ggH) and the pencil (I +
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P2gg
H , I + P2gg
H), respectively. Both Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 demonstrate that the time-sharing scheme is
strictly suboptimal for providing the secrecy capacity region.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy capacity region of a generally non-degraded Gaussian
BC with confidential messages for two users, where the transmitter has t antennas and each user has a
single antenna. For this model, we have proposed a secret dirty-paper coding scheme and introduced a
computable Sato-type outer bound. Furthermore, we have proved that the boundary of the secret dirty-
paper coding rate region is consistent with the Sato-type outer bound for the multiple-antenna Gaussian
BC, and hence, we have obtained the secrecy capacity region for the MGBC-CM.
Unlike the single-antenna Gaussian BC-CM case, in which only the superior user can obtain confidential
information at a positive secrecy rate, our result has illustrated that both users can achieve strictly positive
rates with information-theoretic secrecy through a multiple-antenna Gaussian BC if attenuation vectors
imposed on user 1 and user 2 are linear independent. Therefore, it becomes more practical and more
attractive to achieve information-theoretic secrecy in wireless networks by employing multiple transmit-
antennas at the physical layer.
APPENDIX I
THE GENERALIZED EIGENVALUE AND RAYLEIGH QUOTIENT PROBLEM
A generalized eigenvalue problem is to determine the nontrivial solutions of the equation
Ae = λBe (83)
where A and B are matrices and λ is a scalar. The values of λ that satisfy (83) are the generalized
eigenvalues and the corresponding vectors of e are the generalized eigenvectors.
In particular, if A is Hermitian and B is Hermitian and positive definite, then we have the following
properties of Ae = λBe:
1) The generalized eigenvalues λi are real.
2) The eigenvectors are “B-orthogonal”, i.e.,
eHi Bej = 0 for i 6= j. (84)
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3) Similarly,
eHi Aej = λje
H
i Aej = 0 for i 6= j. (85)
Next, we describe the well-known Rayleigh’s quotient [30] as follows.
Theorem 3: (see [30]) Let r(c) be the Rayleigh’s quotient defined as
r(c) ,
cHAc
cHBc
. (86)
where A is Hermitian and B is Hermitian and positive definite. The quotient R(c) is maximized by the
eigenvector emax corresponding to the largest generalized eigenvalue λmax of the pencil (A,B):
max
c
R(c) =
eHmaxAemax
eHmaxBemax
= λmax (87)
and R(c) is minimized by the eigenvector emin corresponding to the smallest generalized eigenvalue λmin
of the pencil (A,B):
min
c
R(c) =
eHminAemin
eHminBemin
= λmin. (88)
The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in [30, Chapter 6]. Now we prove Lemma 1 based on the Rayleigh’s
quotient principle.
Proof: (Lemma 1) Since both (I + PhhH) and (I + PggH) are Hermitian and positive definite
matrices, the definition of λ1 and Theorem 3 imply that
λ1 = max
c
cH(I + PhhH)c
cH(I + PggH)c
. (89)
We consider a unit vector c0 that is orthogonal with the vector g, i.e.,
cH0 c0 = 1 and cH0 g = 0.
Now, we have
λ1 ≥
cH0 (I + Phh
H)c0
cH0 (I + Pgg
H)c0
= 1 + P |cH0 h|
2. (90)
This implies that λ1 ≥ 1. Furthermore, when h and g are linear independent, there exists a unit vector
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c0 so that
cH0 g = 0 and cH0 h > 0. (91)
Substituting (refeq:lg2) into (90), we obtain λ1 > 1. By using the same approach, we can show that
λ2 ≥ 1, and, in particular, λ2 > 1 when h and g are linear independent.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof: Theorem 1 demonstrates that for a given α ∈ [0, 1], the maximum achievable secrecy rate of
user 1 is γ1(α). This implies that
R1,max = max
0≤α≤1
γ1(α). (92)
We also notice that λ1 = γ1(1). Hence, it is sufficient to show that γ1(α) is a nondecreasing function on
an interval [0, 1].
Let
κ(α) ,
dγ1(α)
dα
. (93)
Based on the definition of γ1(α) in (8), we can write
κ(α) =
P |hHe1|
2(1 + αP |gHe1|
2)− (1 + αP |hHe1|
2)P |gHe1|
2
(1 + αP |gHe1|2)
2
=
P (|hHe1|
2 − |gHe1|
2)
(1 + αP |gHe1|2)
2 (94)
Now, the definitions of λ1 and e1 in (2) imply that
|hHe1|
2 − λ1|g
He1|
2 =
λ1 − 1
P
. (95)
Moreover, Since λ1 ≥ 1 (see Lemma 1), we obtain
κ(α) ≥ 0, (96)
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and hence, γ1(α) is a nondecreasing function on an interval [0, 1]. Therefore, we have
R1,max = max
0≤α≤1
γ1(α) = λ1.
APPENDIX III
SECTION IV DERIVATIONS
(Double-Binning Scheme): By contrast with the classical DPC scheme, the secret DPC scheme is
based on the double-binning code structure as follows. Let
R⋆1 = I(V1; Y2|V2), R
⋆
2 = I(V2; Y1|V1) and R‡ = I(V1;V2). (97)
Generate 2n(Rk+R⋆k+R‡) codewords vnk(wk, jk, lk), wk = 1, 2, . . . , 2Rk , jk = 1, 2, . . . , 2R
⋆
k , lk = 1, 2, . . . , 2
R‡
,
independently at random according to p(vk). Based on the labeling, we partition the codebook {vnk (wk, jk, lk)}
into 2nRk bins, where bin wk represents the message index wk. We further divide bin wk into 2nR
⋆
k sub-bins.
Each sub-bin (wk, jk) contains 2nR
‡
codewords.
To send the message pair (w1, w2), the transmitter employs a joint stochastic encoder. We first randomly
select a sub-bin (w1, j1) from the bin w1 and randomly choose a codeword vn1 (w1, j1, l1) from the sub-
bin (w1, j1). Next, we randomly select a sub-bin (w2, j2) from the bin w2 and find a codeword vn2 (w2, j2, l2)
in the sub-bin (w2, j2) so that the sequences vn1 (w1, j1, l1) and vn2 (w2, j2, l2) are jointly typical with
respective to p(v1,v2). Since each sub-bin contains 2nI(V1;V2) codewords, the encoding is successful with
probability close to 1 as long as n is large. Finally, we generate the channel input sequence xn(w1, w2)
according to the mapping p(x|v1,v2).
Proof: (Lemma 3) We first check the power constraint. Since U1 and U2 are independent and
X = U1 +U2,
the covariance matrices KU1 and KU2 satisfy
tr(KU1 +KU2) = tr(KX) ≤ P. (98)
Following from [29, Theorem 1] and using the setting in (30), we can immediately obtain the well-
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known successive dirty-paper encoding result:
I(V1; Y1)− I(V1;V2) = I(U1;h
HU1 + Z1)
= log2(1 + h
HKU1h). (99)
Since V2 = U2 is independent of U1 and V1 = U1 + bhHU2, we obtain
I(V1; Y2|V2) = I(U1 + bh
HU2; Y2|U2)
= I(U1; Y2|U2)
= log2(1 + g
HKU1g). (100)
Combining (22), (99) and (100), we have
R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1)− I(V1;V2)− I(V1; Y2|V2)
= log2
1 + hHKU1h
1 + gHKU1g
. (101)
Moreover, we can compute
I(V2; Y2) = h(Y2)− h(Y2|V2)
= h(gH(U1 +U2) + Z2)− h(g
HU1 + Z2)
= log2
1 + gH(KU1 +KU2)g
1 + gHKU1g
. (102)
and
I(V2; Y1|V1) + I(V1;V2) = I(V1,V2; Y1)− [I(V1; Y1)− I(V1;V2)]
= log2
1 + hH(KU1 +KU2)h
1 + hHKU1h
. (103)
Substituting (102) and (103) into (23), we obtain that
R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2)− I(V1;V2)− I(V2; Y1|V1)
= log2
1 + gH(KU1 +KU2)g
1 + gHKU1g
− log2
1 + hH(KU1 +KU2)h
1 + hHKU1h
= log2
1 + gH(KU1 +KU2)g
1 + hH(KU1 +KU2)h
+ log2
1 + hHKU1h
1 + gHKU1g
. (104)
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Applying Lemma 2 with bounds (101) and (104), we have the desired result.
Proof: (Equation (40)) For convenience,we define
d(KU1, KU2) ,
[1 + gH(KU1 +KU2)g][1 + h
HKU1h]
[1 + hH(KU1 +KU2)h][1 + g
HKU1g]
=
[
1 +
gHKU2g
1 + gHKU1g
] [
1 +
hHKU2h
1 + hHKU1h
]−1
. (105)
Since cH2 (α)c2(α) = 1, we substitute (35) into d(KU1 , KU2) and obtain
d(KU1, KU2) =
[
1 +
(1− α)PgHc2(α)cH2 (α)g
1 + αP |gHe1|2
] [
1 +
(1− α)PhHc2(α)cH2 (α)h
1 + αP |hHe1|2
]−1
=
cH2 (α)c2(α) +
(1− α)PcH2 (α)gg
Hc2(α)
1 + αP |gHe1|2
cH2 (α)c2(α) +
(1− α)PcH2 (α)hh
Hc2(α)
1 + αP |hHe1|2
=
cH2 (α)
[
I +
(1− α)PggH
1 + αP |gHe1|2
]
c2(α)
cH2 (α)
[
I +
(1− α)PhhH
1 + αP |hHe1|2
]
c2(α)
. (106)
Note that γ2(α) and c2(α) are the largest generalized eigenvalue and the corresponding normalized
eigenvector of the pencil (9), i.e.,
(
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
ggH
)
c2(α) = γ2(α)
(
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |hHe1|2
hhH
)
c2(α).
Hence, we have
d2(KU1 , KU2) = γ2(α). (107)
APPENDIX IV
SECTION V DERIVATIONS
Proof: (Lemma 4) It is sufficient to show that the error probability P (n)e and the equivocations
H(W2|Y n1 ) and H(W2|Y n1 ) are the same for the channels pY˜1,Y˜2|X ∈ P when we use the same codebook
and encoding schemes. We note that
P (n)e = max
{
P
(n)
e,1 , P
(n)
e,2
}
≤ P (n)e,1 + P
(n)
e,2 . (108)
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Hence, P (n)e is small if and only if both P (n)e,1 and P
(n)
e,2 are small. However, for given codebook and
encoding scheme p(xn|w1, w2), the decoding error probability P (n)e,k and the equivocation rate at user k
depend only on the marginal channel probability density pY˜k|X. Therefore, the same code and encoding
scheme for any pY˜1,Y˜2|X ∈ P gives the same P
(n)
e and equivocation rates. This concludes the proof.
Proof: (Theorem 2) Here we prove Theorem 2 and derive the outer bound for R1. The outer bound
for R2 follows by symmetry.
The secrecy requirement (7) implies that
nR1 = H(W1) ≤ H(W1|Y
n
2 ) + nǫ. (109)
On the other hand, Fano’s inequality and Pe ≤ ǫ imply that
H(W1|Y
n
1 ) ≤ ǫ log(M1 − 1) + h(ǫ) , nδ1. (110)
where h(x) is the binary entropy function. Based on (109) and (110), we have
nR1 ≤ H(W1|Y
n
2 ) + nǫ
≤ H(W1|Y
n
2 )−H(W1|Y
n
1 ) + n(δ1 + ǫ)
≤ H(W1|Y
n
2 )−H(W1|Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 ) + n(δ1 + ǫ) (111)
= I(W1; Y
n
1 |Y
n
2 ) + n(δ1 + ǫ) (112)
where (111) follows from conditioning reducing entropy. Since W1 → Xn → (Y n1 , Y n2 ) forms a Markov
chain, we can further bound (112) as follows
nR1 ≤ I(X
n; Y n1 |Y
n
2 ) + n(δ1 + ǫ)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y1,i|Y2,i) + n(δ1 + ǫ). (113)
Finally, by applying Lemma 4, we can replace Y1 and Y2 by Y˜1 and Y˜2, respectively. Hence, we have
the Sato-type outer bound on R1.
Proof: (Lemma 5) Here, we proof Lemma 5 based on the Sato-type outer bound in Theorem 2.
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For the Gaussian BC defined in (45), the upper bound (42) on R1 can be rewritten as follows:
I(X; Y˜1, Y˜2)− I(X; Y˜2) = h(Y˜1, Y˜2)− h(Y˜1, Y˜2|X)− h(Y˜2) + h(Y˜2|X)
= h(Y˜1|Y˜2)− [h(Z˜1, Z˜2)− h(Z˜2)]
= h(Y˜1|Y˜2)− log2(2πe)(1− |ρ|
2). (114)
The first term of (114) can be further bounded as follows
h(Y˜1|Y˜2) = h(Y˜1 − νY˜2|Y˜2)
≤ h(Y˜1 − νY˜2) for any ν ∈ C (115)
where the inequality follows from removing conditioning. Moreover, the maximum-entropy theorem [22]
implies that
h(Y˜1 − νY˜2) ≤ log2(2πe)
∣∣Var[Y˜1 − νY˜2]∣∣
= log2(2πe)
∣∣Var[(h− νg)HX]+Var[Z˜1 − νZ˜2]∣∣
= log2(2πe)
[
(h− νg)HKX(h− νg) + 1 + |ν|
2 − ν∗ρ− ρ∗ν
]
. (116)
Combining (114), (115) and (116), we obtain the following upper bound:
I(X; Y˜1, Y˜2)− I(X; Y˜2) ≤ min
ν∈C
log2
(h− νg)HKX(h− νg) + 1 + |ν|2 − ν∗ρ− ρ∗ν
(1− |ρ|2)
(117)
= f1(ρ,KX). (118)
Next we prove that for given ρ and KX, the expression I(X; Y˜1, Y˜2) − I(X; Y˜2) is maximized by
Gaussian input distributions. When X is a Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and covariance matrix
KX, the channel (45) implies that Y˜1 and Y˜2 are zero-mean Gaussian random variables. Choosing
ν = νo =
Cov
[
Y˜1, Y˜2
]
Var
[
Y˜2
] . (119)
Note that
E
[
(Y˜1 − νoY˜2)Y˜
∗
2
]
= Cov
[
Y˜1, Y˜2
]
− νoVar
[
Y˜2
]
= 0, (120)
the Gaussian random variables Y˜1 − νoY˜2 and Y˜2 are uncorrelated, and hence they are statistically inde-
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pendent. This implies that
h(Y˜1|Y˜2) = h(Y˜1 − νoY˜2)
= log2(2πe)
[
(h− νog)
HKX(h− νog) + 1 + |νo|
2 − ν∗oρ− ρ
∗νo
]
. (121)
Inserting (121) into (114) we have
I(X; Y˜1, Y˜2)− I(X; Y˜2) = log2
(h− νog)HKX(h− νog) + 1 + |νo|2 − ν∗oρ− ρ
∗νo
(1− |ρ|2)
≥ f1(ρ,KX). (122)
Bounds (118) and (122) imply that Gaussian input distributions are optimal for the expression I(X; Y˜1, Y˜2)−
I(X; Y˜2).
Following the same approach, we can prove that for given ρ and KX, Gaussian input distributions
maximize the expression I(X; Y˜1, Y˜2)−I(X; Y˜1), the upper bound (43) on R2. This lets us restrict attention
to zero-mean Gaussian X with covariance matrix KX. Now, bounds (42) and (43) become
R1 ≤ f1(ρ,KX) (123)
and R2 ≤ f2(ρ,KX) (124)
This yields the rate region RMGO (ρ,KX). Hence we have the desired result.
Proof: (Lemma 6) For a given KX, we first evaluate L(KX, 0) and L(KX, 1). Since γ1(0) = 1 and
the input covariance matrix KX is positive semidefinite, we obtain
L(KX, 0) = (h− ρog)
HKX(h− ρog) ≥ 0. (125)
On the other hand, since γ1(1) = λ1 and KX is Hermitian and positive semidefinite, we have
L(KX, 1) = (h− ρoλ1g)
H(KX − Pe1e
H
1 )(h− ρoλ1g)
≤ tr(KX)|h− ρoλ1g|
2 − P |(h− ρoλ1g)
He1|
2
≤ P |h− ρoλ1g|
2 − P |(h− ρoλ1g)
He1|
2. (126)
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Based on the definition of ρo in (51), we can compute
h− ρoλ1g = h− λ1
ggHe1
hHe1
=
(hhH − λ1ggH)e1
hHe1
=
(λ1 − 1)e1
PhHe1
(127)
where the last step follows from the definitions λ1 and e1 in (2). Moreover, since eH1 e1 = 1, (127) can
be rewritten as
L(KX, 1) ≤ P
∣∣∣∣(λ1 − 1)e1PhHe1
∣∣∣∣
2
− P
∣∣∣∣ λ1 − 1PhHe1eH1 e1
∣∣∣∣
2
= 0 (128)
We note that L(KX, α) is a continuous function on the interval α ∈ [0, 1] for a give KX. Since
L(KX, 0) ≥ 0 and L(KX, 1) ≤ 0, there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that L(KX, α) = 0.
Proof: (Lemma 7) We note that λ1 and e1 are the largest generalized eigenvalue and the corre-
sponding normalized eigenvector of the pencil [I + PhhH , I + PggH ]. Based on the Rayleigh’s quotient
principle in Theorem 3, we obtain
max
c
cH(I + PhhH)c
cH(I + PggH)c
=
eH1 (I + Phh
H)e1
eH1 (I + Pgg
H)e1
= λ1. (129)
Hence, we have
min
c
(1 + αP |gHe1|
2) + cH [(1− α)PggH]c
(1 + αP |hHe1|2) + cH [(1− α)PhhH]c
=
eH1 (I + Pgg
H)e1
eH1 (I + Phh
H)e1
=
1
λ1
. (130)
By using the definition of γ1(α) in (8), we have
min
c
cH
[
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
ggH
]
c
cH
[
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |hHe1|2
hhH
]
c
=
eH1
[
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
ggH
]
e1
eH1
[
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |hHe1|2
hhH
]
e1
=
γ1(α)
λ1
. (131)
Now, the Rayleigh’s quotient principle implies that γ1(α)/λ1 and e1(α) are the smallest generalized
eigenvalue and the corresponding normalized eigenvector of the pencil (9).
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Proof: (Lemma 8) We first show that [g− ρ∗oγ2(α)h] ∝ c2(α). Since γ1(α) is real and
ρo =
1
γ1(α)
[
hHc2(α)
gHc2(α)
]∗
, (132)
we have
g − ρ∗oγ2(α)h = g −
γ2(α)
γ1(α)
hhHc2(α)
gHc2(α)
=
[γ1(α)gg
H − γ2(α)hhH ]c2(α)
γ1(α)gHc2(α)
. (133)
Note that (36) implies that
[
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
ggH − γ2(α)
(1− α)P
1 + αP |hHe1|2
hhH
]
c2(α) = [γ2(α)− 1]c2(α). (134)
Based on the definition of γ1(α) in (8), we obtain
[γ1(α)gg
H − γ2(α)hh
H ]c2(α) =
1 + αP |hHe1|2
(1− α)P
[γ2(α)− 1]c2(α). (135)
Now, we can rewritten (133) as
g − ρ∗oγ2(α)h =
(1 + αP |hHe1|2)[γ2(α)− 1]
γ1(α)gHc2(α)(1− α)P
c2(α). (136)
Hence, we obtain
g − ρ∗oγ2(α)h
|g− ρ∗oγ2(α)h|
2
= c2(α). (137)
Next we prove that [h− ρoγ1(α)g]Hc2(α) = 0. The definitions of λ1 and e1 in (2) implies that
hhHe1 =
[
λ1 − 1
P
I + λ1gg
H
]
e1. (138)
Substituting (138) into (59), we obtain
h− ρoγ1(α)g =
1
hHe1
[
λ1 − 1
P
I + λ1gg
H − γ1(α)gg
H
]
e1
=
λ1 − 1
PhHe1
[
I +
λ1 − γ1(α)
λ1 − 1
PggH
]
e1. (139)
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Based on the definition of γ1(α) in (8), we obtain
λ1 − γ1(α) = λ1 −
1 + αP |hHe1|
2
1 + αP |gHe1|2
=
(λ1 − 1) + αP (λ1|g
He1|
2 − |hHe1|
2)
1 + αP |gHe1|2
= (λ1 − 1)
1− α
1 + αP |gHe1|2
(140)
where the last step follows from (52). Substituting (139) into (140), we have
h− ρoγ1(α)g =
λ1 − 1
PhHe1
[
I +
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
ggH
]
e1. (141)
Now (64) and (141) imply that
[h− ρoγ1(α)g]
Hc2(α) = 0. (142)
Combining with (137), we have the desired result.
Proof: (Equation (77)) First, we consider ζ(α) defined in (75). Based on (133) and (136), ζ(α) can
be rewritten as
ζ(α) = [g − ρ∗oγ2(α)h]
H [g − ρ∗oγ2(α)h]
=
(1 + αP |hHe1|2)[γ2(α)− 1]
(1− α)P
{
cH2 (α)[γ1(α)gg
H − γ2(α)hhH ]c2(α)
|γ1(α)gHc2(α)|2
}
=
[
1 + αP |hHe1|2
(1− α)P
]
[γ2(α)− 1]
[
1
γ1(α)
− γ2(α)|ρo|
2
]
. (143)
Now, we consider
(1− α)Pζ(α) = [γ2(α)− 1][1 + αP |g
He1|
2 − γ2(α)|ρo|
2 − αP |hHe1|
2γ2(α)|ρo|
2]
= [γ2(α)− 1]{1− γ2(α)|ρo|
2 + αP |gHe1|
2[1− γ2(α)]} (144)
where the last step of (144) follows from ρo = (gHe1)/(hHe1).
Next, we consider η(α) defined in (76). Note that (66) implies that
|eH1 c2(α)|
2 =
[
(1− α)P
1 + αP |gHe1|2
]2
|gHe1|
2|gHc2(α)|
2. (145)
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Combining (132), (143) and (145), we obtain
η(α) = ζ(α)|eH1 c2(α)|
2
=
(1 + αP |hHe1|2)(γ2(α)− 1)
(1− α)P
[
1
γ1(α)
−
γ2(α)
γ21(α)
∣∣∣∣hHc2gHc2
∣∣∣∣
2
]
|eH1 c2(α)|
2
= [γ2(α)− 1]|g
He1|
2
[
(1− α)P |gHc2(α)|
2
1 + αP |gHe1|2
− γ2(α)
(1− α)P |hHc2(α)|
2
1 + αP |hHe1|2
]
= [γ2(α)− 1]
2|gHe1|
2 (146)
where the last step of (146) follows from the definition of γ2(α) in (36). Combining (144) and (146), we
obtain the desired result.
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